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The Longfellow Bridge, connecting Boston and 
Cambridge, is in bad shape, due not only to its 
age and the ravages of our weather, but also to 
a troubling and persistent lack of maintenance.  
Fixing the bridge, in effect paying the bill for 
our unwillingness to maintain it, is estimated 
to cost at least $180 million, with the potential 
for cost overruns reaching into the hundreds of 
millions.  
Once the bridge is rebuilt, will we again let 
it deteriorate without proper maintenance, 
running up another massive repair bill for future 
generations? The neglect of the Longfellow 
Bridge is symptomatic of a problem that 
encompasses almost all the assets owned by the 
Commonwealth.  
The MBTA, UMass, MassHighway, Department 
of Conservation and Recreation, and the County 
Sheriffs each have maintenance backlogs 
in excess of $1 billion apiece.  Overall, the 
Commonwealth’s physical assets suffer from a 
maintenance backlog in the tens of billions of 
dollars.  However, the calculation of an overall 
state figure is a difficult exercise, as there is 
no centralized system for comprehensively 
managing the state’s assets.  The responsibility 
for asset maintenance is scattered across 
state government, idiosyncratic in form and 
execution, and riddled with redundancies and 
ambiguities, particularly regarding the practical 
responsibilities of the Division of Capital Asset 
Management and the various executive branch 
agencies.  
No matter which entity is responsible, every 
state asset suffers from the same treatment. We 
fail to adequately budget for maintenance; even 
worse, we actively create perverse incentives
that discourage state managers from maintaining 
state assets. 
Any maintenance spending from an agency’s 
operating budget reduces funds available 
for programs.  The postponement of routine 
maintenance maximizes operating funds 
available in the current year, but also hastens 
the failure of capital assets. The eventual 
failure of the assets will result in an emergency 
disbursement of capital funds, which are under 
DCAM’s control and will not impact the 
agency’s operating budget.  Thus managers 
who spend money on maintenance are in effect 
penalized for trying to maintain their assets.
There is no comprehensive plan in place to stop 
the problem from growing worse.  Budgeting for 
maintenance simply lacks the inherent political 
appeal of new spending on new assets.  Every 
new structure that is built, every road that is 
paved, every new asset the Commonwealth 
builds is doomed to decay prematurely through a 
lack of maintenance. 
This problem will not be solved in a single step.  
It will require a sustained, multi-generational 
effort. The first step is to stop exacerbating 
the problem.  We must reexamine our current 
practices, including our financial reporting 
requirements and our asset management 
structure, and determine their impact.
We should also consider the innovations 
of other states.  Utah and Missouri have 
established mandatory set-asides of state funds 
for maintenance.  Washington and Virginia 
have increased accountability and transparency 
through comprehensive assessments of 
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maintenance needs and regular reporting 
on performance. 
In addition, alternative contracting mechanisms 
have the potential to extend the life-cycle 
of assets by contractually obligating proper 
maintenance budgeting and execution. 
To address its systemic asset maintenance 
problem, as symbolized by the Longfellow 
Bridge, the Commonwealth should:
- Stop building new assets without first 
examining and budgeting for their life-cycle 
costs, including regular maintenance.  
- Measure the condition of the 
Commonwealth’s assets, and present easy-to-
understand metrics of expenditures and progress 
in a comprehensive, standardized public report.  
Proper measurement of maintenance needs will 
also require changes to the state’s accounting 
Photo by Christopher Penler
system to allow easier tracking of maintenance, 
as well as the adoption of financial reporting 
standards that emphasize asset management. 
- Budget for maintenance by requiring agencies 
to expend operating funds equal to 2 percent 
of asset replacement value on maintenance, 
establishing a Facilities Maintenance Reserve 
Fund, and utilize budgetary surpluses to perform 
pay-as-you-go maintenance. 
- Execute on improved maintenance practices 
by empowering those agencies with maintenance 
oversight, providing leadership from the 
Governor’s Office, and mandating the usage of 
asset management systems.
- Reward managers and department heads with 
additional funding if they take a responsible 
approach to asset maintenance.  
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Bridges are the physical manifestation of 
vital connections between communities.  The 
Longfellow Bridge connects two economic and 
cultural powerhouses - Boston and Cambridge 
- yet suffers from such neglect and disrepair 
that reconstruction may cost several times more 
than the price of simply building a new bridge.  
The bridge’s problems, clearly visible to the 
naked eye but even more dramatic below the 
surface, are symptomatic of a statewide failure 
to maintain our public assets.  This deferral of 
maintenance is caused by a number of factors:
-  Unwillingness to prioritize maintenance over      
   new projects.
-  Diffusion of responsibility for assets across            
   disparate public entities.
-  Political incentives that discourage spending  
   on maintenance.
The result is a wasteful shortening of service 
life, a dysfunctional asset construction scheme, 
and ultimately, diminished quality of life for the 
Commonwealth’s citizens. 
To define the problem and propose a better way, 
this paper will present:  
- The Longfellow Bridge’s design, construction,      
   history, current condition and urgent   
   maintenance needs.
-  Hypothetical models of how sustained
   investment would have reduced the overall
   cost of owning the Longfellow Bridge for the
   past hundred years.
-  A broader portrait of how the Commonwealth 
   maintains – or fails to maintain – all of our 
   vital physical infrastructure, and an exploration 
   of political and bureaucratic obstacles to
   proper maintenance.   
-  An overview of how other states have
   confronted their maintenance needs, and policy 
   recommendations for the Commonwealth.
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2.1  History
Transportation between Boston and Cambridge 
has been important since the earliest days of 
English settlement in Massachusetts. Three 
structures have been built over the Charles River 
where the Longfellow Bridge currently stands.  
A wooden bridge built in 1792 was replaced 
in 1854 by a second wooden bridge.   The 
bridge that stands today was constructed out of 
granite and steel in 1907.  The first bridge was 
immortalized in Henry Wadsworth Longfellow’s 
poem “The Bridge,” which begins:
 “I stood on the bridge at midnight,
 As the clocks were striking the hour,
 And the moon rose o’er the city,
 Behind the dark church tower,
 I saw her bright reflections
 In the waters under me,
 Like a golden goblet falling,
 And sinking into the sea…”
Massachusetts Governor John Hancock ratified 
incorporation of the West Boston Bridge 
Corporation in 1792. 1 Construction began on 
a causeway on July 15, 1792 and work on a 
wooden bridge began on April 6, 1793. 2 The 
causeway and bridge replaced a ferry service 
paid for in part by Harvard College.  The 
bridge was 40 feet wide and included a 30-foot 
drawbridge that allowed ships to pass by.  
The proprietors of the West Boston Bridge 
opened it to the public on November 23, 1793.  
Tolls were collected for 40 years, after which the 
bridge was turned over to the Commonwealth.  
Initially, the proprietors were required to pay
300 pounds per annum to Harvard College to 
support indigent scholars. 
Under an act passed by the Legislature on March 
26, 1846, the bridge and causeway were sold to 
the Hancock Free Bridge Corporation in July of 
that year.  The wooden bridge was completely 
rebuilt in 1854 and transferred to the City of 
Cambridge by an act passed in 1857.  Tolls 
were no longer charged and horse-drawn rail 
cars began using the bridge on March 26, 1856.  
This bridge lasted until 1899, when a temporary 
bridge was built and work began on the granite 
and steel bridge that stands today.
Plans to replace the old bridge began to take 
shape in 1890.  Since the Charles River was 
considered a navigable stream, the federal 
War Department had to approve construction 
plans for a drawless bridge.  President William 
McKinley authorized the bridge on March 29, 
1890. 3 
The new bridge was designed by Edmund M. 
Wheelwright, twice director of the American 
Institute of Architects and a fellow to the 
Boston Society of Architects.  Wheelwright 
also designed the Boston Public Library, 
Horticultural Hall, and Jordan Hall, and was 
consulting architect for the Bulkeley Bridge in 
Hartford, Connecticut.
The new bridge’s style was inspired by the 
1893 Columbian Exposition.  The Exposition, 
held in Chicago, was a celebration of the 400th 
anniversary of Columbus’ founding of the new 
world and included buildings from the world’s 
great architects.  
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With its characteristic towers and stonework, 
including ornate sculptures of Viking ships, 
the West Boston Bridge was to rival the great 
bridges of Europe.  The shape of its four 
ornamental granite towers gave the bridge its 
nickname: the salt and pepper bridge.
William Jackson, Boston’s City Engineer, was 
the structural designer.  Mortared granite piers 
are connected by eleven steel arches, which 
support a concrete deck.  Two mass-transit rail 
lines were later added to the center of the bridge.
Construction began in 1900 with the placing 
of 20,168 wooden piles in the riverbed for the 
10 stone and concrete piers, and the abutments 
on each bank.  The construction process is 
well documented in the Bulletins of the Boston 
Society of Civil Engineers. 4  Almost 17,000 
cubic yards of stone granite and 77,421 cubic 
yards of concrete were placed prior to steel 
erection. Erection of the steel superstructure was 
completed by the Phoenix Bridge Company in 
November 1904, and surfacing of the roadway 
finished approximately a year later.  Total cost 
for the bridge was $2,654,896, which equates to 
$137,809,259 in 2007 dollars. 5
Over 100,000 people attended the grand 
opening of the new West Boston Bridge on 
July 31, 1907.  Festivities included a parade, an 
invitation-only lunch, a grandstand with 2,000 
ticketed guests, a program of speeches and 
evening fireworks. 
In 1927, upon petition from the Cambridge 
Historical Society to the Massachusetts 
Legislature’s Committee on Metropolitan 
Affairs, it was proposed to rename the bridge 
after Henry Wadsworth Longfellow.  A group of 
Cambridge citizens representing the Historical 
Society, lead by Judge Robert Walcott and 
Professor Ephraim Emerton of Harvard 
University, spoke in favor of the change.  
Judge Wolcott read a letter from a daughter of 
Longfellow, which said that the poet pictured 
a former bridge at the same location when he 
wrote “The Bridge”.
Mr. Van Ness Bates of Brookline took exception 
to the change at the hearing.  He said, “The 
present day bridge with the high mass of stone 
and roaring trains” would not be in keeping with 
the solitude and meditation which characterized 
the poet.  The Historical Society prevailed, 
however, and the name change was made 
official. ”His” bridge became another historical 
point of interest to the many Longfellow 
admirers of the day. 6
Figure 1:  Postcard of the West Boston Bridge
(Source: Applewood Books)
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2.2  The Bridge Today
A century later, the Longfellow Bridge carries 
over 49,500 vehicles per day, 7 plus an estimated 
97,000 daily MBTA Red Line transit passengers. 
This traffic volume means that the Longfellow is 
subject to a bridge inspection program.   Though 
the bridge falls under the jurisdiction of the 
Commonwealth’s Department of Conservation 
and Recreation, the Massachusetts Highway 
Department (MHD) assists DCR with inspection 
of bridges under its jurisdiction. 
The Longfellow has undergone two repair 
projects; first in 1959, then again in 2002. The 
1959 project included some structural repairs 
and replacements while the 2002 project spent 
approximately $1.1 million of the $3.2 million 
total on steel repairs and completed sidewalk 
and street light safety repairs.   About $160,000 
was spent on graffiti removal.
The most recent inspection of the bridge was 
done on September 21, 2006.8, 9   The inspection 
report includes remarks about the major 
components of the bridge including: the bridge 
deck and approaches, the steel superstructure 
that supports the deck, and the substructure 
that includes the river piers, granite towers and 
abutments.  The report also provides remarks on 
traffic safety and includes 21 photographs taken 
during the inspection.
Bridge Deck
The original bridge deck that supports the 
roadways consists of a 3/8” thick steel buckle 
plate supporting a 7” thick unreinforced 
concrete deck.  The deck is supported by a set 
of stringers and beams located below the deck.  
The checkerboard of structural steel is supported 
by posts that carry the load to the arch members 
below. The curved arches are the main structural 
members of the bridge.  Pleasing in appearance 
with their graceful curves, they support the 
bridge and transfer the loads to the stone piers 
in the river.  There are ten granite piers across 
the river and the bridge ends on each side with a 
stone abutment located on either bank. 
Figure 2:  Generic Bridge Structure Diagram
(Source: Authors)
During the 1959 reconstruction, areas of the 
deck were replaced with reinforced concrete.  
The 2006 inspection report described some of 
the original deck sections as being in “[s]erious 
condition with large rust holes (100% section 
loss) in the buckle plates with voids due to 
deterioration of the concrete deck.” 8  The term 
“100% section loss” means that portions of the 
arch ribs have corroded to the extent that 100% 
of the cross section of the rib is rusted away 
and holes appear in the rib.  A 50% section loss 
would mean that half of the rib section was still 
available for carrying load and holes would not 
be visible.
These conditions are comparable to those 
of many Interstate bridges whose decks are 
deteriorating.  In those cases, nettings or false 
work is put in place below the deck to prevent 
concrete deck debris from falling onto traffic 
below.  Under the Longfellow, any deteriorating 
deck debris falls into the Charles River.
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Superstructure
The steel superstructure includes stringers and 
floor beams that transfer the load of the deck 
and traffic through posts to the arched beams of 
the bridge.  The 2006 inspection report states 
that “[t]he stringers are in poor condition with 
heavy rusting and section loss.”
Some of the stringers were repaired during the 
2002 rehabilitation, but most suffer from severe 
section loss.  The girders over the approach span 
over Memorial Drive outbound also display 
collision damage from accidents on the street 
below. Figure 4: Beams (perpendicular to bridge)
and Stringers (sections with “x” bracing)
(Source: DCR 2006 Inspection Report)
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Floor Beams
The floor beams in all spans show severe 
corrosion and some have 100 percent section 
loss in the center section under the MBTA 
Red Line tracks, which the inspection report 
attributes to “[w]ater leaking through the two 
longitudinal joints in the median.” Some of 
these beams have repair plates from the 1959 
rehabilitation. The application of salt and de-
icing materials to the road surface has intensified 
this deterioration.   The freezing, thawing and 
refreezing cycles of a New England winter also 
accelerate the process.
Figure 5: 100% section loss to stringer
(Source: DCR 2006 Inspection Report)
Arch Ribs
The curved arch ribs are the main pieces of 
the superstructure. They consist of 12 curved 
riveted girders in each of the 11 spans.  Riveted 
girders are no longer commonly used for this 
purpose; modern bridges use welded structural 
steel girders or precast concrete girders.  The 
2006 Inspection Report notes that “[t]he arch 
ribs have heavy rusting throughout with heavy 
section loss [in] the top flange outer edges.” 
Repair plates have been added to the ribs, 
particularly at the ends near the piers where 
some of the outer ribs have 100% section loss.
Substructure: Bridge Piers
The substructure consists of the 10 granite 
piers in the river and 2 abutments, one on 
the Boston side near Leverett Circle and the 
other on the Cambridge side along Memorial 
Drive.  The substructure supports the steel 
and concrete superstructure and includes the 
visible stone piers above the river waterline 
and the stonework and wooden piles below the 
waterline. The pier walls display a variety of 
cracked and deteriorated mortar joints. Four of 
the piers have vertical cracks extending down 
through four courses of granite block and some 
have vertical cracks extending all the way down 
to the water line.
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The bridge’s four distinctive ornamental 
towers are located on piers numbered 5 and 
6.  Within these piers is a large bed of sand 
upon which the towers rest.  Based on a 2003 
consultant’s report, the towers have settled 
since construction.  The tower on Pier 5 has 
settled about 1 to 2 inches and the tower on Pier 
6 has settled about 5 to 6 inches.  The towers 
are leaning due to this settlement and there are 
vertical cracks in the granite.  
While there appears to be no settlement in 
the piers themselves, the settlement of the 
towers will require complete disassembly and 
reconstruction.
Figure 6: Bridge Pier (below bridge deck)
and Tower (above bridge deck)
(Source: Authors)
Figure 7: Cracking in Pier
(Photo by Peter Begley)
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Figure 8: Cracking in Pier
(Photo by Peter Begley)
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Overall design and construction
The Longfellow’s problems are rooted in its 
design, and the construction methods used to 
build it. There is a reason that bridges today are 
built differently than they were a hundred 
years ago. 
The most significant drawbacks of the 
Longfellow’s design involve its foundation 
and substructure. The Longfellow is built on 
20,000 wooden pilings driven into the bed of 
the Charles River.  Under current engineering 
practice, steel or concrete piles would be 
driven down to bedrock, or structural shafts 
and caissons would be built.  This virtually 
eliminates settlement in new bridges. 
Water has also affected the granite piers, as 
the cycle of freezing and thawing has shifted 
and deteriorated the granite blocks. Most 
bridges built since 1930 are made of reinforced 
concrete substructures with steel or concrete 
superstructures.  Granite blocks are no longer 
used in modern bridges. Block construction 
requires frequent repointing of the mortar joints 
to keep the effects of moisture from eventually 
shifting the blocks. 
Removal of the bridge deck and coring and 
reinforcing the piers with a new foundation 
may be the only economical alternative to 
avoid further settling and deterioration.  Newer 
projects are designed to minimize the need 
for such maintenance.  For instance, piers for 
the Leonard Zakim/Bunker Hill Bridge are 
constructed of solid reinforced concrete. 
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The 2006 inspection of the Longfellow provides 
insight into how the bridge has deteriorated 
since its construction, despite the two 
rehabilitations in 1959 and 2002.  It also enables 
us to compare the cost of alternate approaches 
to stewardship of a capital asset. The first, 
involving minimal upkeep and the renovation 
or replacement of the bridge after 100 years, is 
a fact. The second is hypothetical: How much 
could the Commonwealth have saved by taking 
proper care of the Longfellow for the past 
hundred years?  This comparison highlights the 
urgency of changing the way we maintain our 
infrastructure.
3.1  Estimated Costs of
        Rebuilding or Replacement
The 2006 inspection report – or even a cursory 
visual inspection of the Bridge – confirms the 
need for major renovation.  The first public 
meeting on the proposed project was held in 
May 2006 by MassHighway, and included a 
presentation on the extent of renovations needed 
and potential construction scenarios. 10  It was 
hoped that a final plan could be put in place by 
2007 or 2008, in order to allow for construction 
between 2009 and 2013. 
The bridge is considered safe and not in danger 
of imminent failure, but its deterioration 
means that action must be taken within the 
next few years, before safety concerns may 
force its closure. Most urgent are the structural 
deficiencies of the stringers, floor beams and 
posts, which are rated as “4-Poor,” on a scale of 
“1-Imminent failure to “9-Excellent.” 
In addition to these flaws in the superstructure, 
the reconstruction process will include a 
thorough investigation of the substructure,
including the piers and the wooden pile 
foundation below them.  Evaluation must 
account for the dead weight of the bridge, 
traffic and MBTA train loads, wind and snow 
loads and a consideration of seismic impacts.  A 
best-case scenario would find that the piers and 
foundations are still capable of withstanding all 
loading conditions.  The worst-case scenario 
would be that the piers and foundations would 
require structural enhancements before the 
superstructure and deck can be rehabilitated.  
The bridge structure and deck will be renovated 
while maintaining most MBTA Red Line rail 
service and three of the four lanes of traffic.  
The entire bridge deck will be removed and 
replaced in several stages, limiting vehicular 
and Red Line traffic to alternate lanes while one 
or more lanes are under construction.  Limited 
construction access will increase the time 
needed for renovation and may cause some 
temporary suspension (on weekends) of Red 
Line service. 
Structural members, including the arches, ribs 
and posts supporting the deck would then be 
repaired in place or removed and replaced.  The 
bridge seats, where the arches sit on the piers, 
and the substructure itself may also need to 
be replaced in certain locations, which could 
further extend projected construction schedules.  
The recommended tower repairs are to be 
completed by dismantling and rebuilding them.  
Once down to the sand base, an inspection can 
be made of the granite blocks below river level.  
At that point a decision can be made
on whether the base is suitable for rebuilding. 
The four towers are located on two of the ten
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piers, but the other eight piers may have to be 
similarly dismantled and rebuilt.
The initial cost estimates are preliminary, since 
much of the work cannot be precisely estimated 
until the foundations are exposed.  On January 
22, 2006, Jon Carlisle, then of the Executive 
Office of Transportation, stated that “[t]he 
current $70 million price tag could rise to $100 
million.” 11 Currently, the official Massachusetts 
Highway Department estimate is $180 
million.  The report of the Commonwealth’s 
Transportation Finance Commission, issued on 
March 28, 2007, estimated repair costs at $200 
million.12 
Given the preliminary nature of these estimates 
and the potential for substantial additional 
construction depending on the condition of the 
piers, it is conceivable that the actual cost of 
reconstructing the Longfellow could be several 
times the current estimates. 
With an approximate total historical cost of $270 
million (see table on page 13) plus the current 
estimated cost of repairs of $200 million for a 
total of $470 million, a new replacement bridge 
begins to appear economically reasonable. 
However, given the historical and cultural 
significance of the Longfellow, the construction 
of a new bridge is an unlikely alternative.
3.2  The Road Not Taken:
        Two Alternative
        Life-Cycle Scenarios
The following scenarios demonstrate that the 
massive reconstruction cost of the Longfellow 
could have been reduced through a cost-effective 
plan of proper maintenance. We will compare 
the Commonwealth’s actual investment in the 
bridge with the hypothetical impact that proper 
maintenance could have had.
As mentioned previously, the total cost for 
the bridge in 1907 was $2,654,896, which, 
based on the ENR Construction Cost index, 
equates to $249 million in 2007 dollars.  The 
1959 rehabilitation cost an estimated $2 
million and the 2002 rehabilitation cost $3.2 
million. 8  Although there are normal annual 
operational expenditures for routine activities 
like line painting and snow removal, these 
two rehabilitation projects are the only known 
major work performed on the bridge since its 
construction in 1907.   Some small contracts 
have recently been let to improve the lighting 
systems on the bridge.  Based on the ENR 
Construction Cost Index, the $2 million 1959 
rehabilitation would be equivalent to $19.7 
million and the $3.2 million 2002 rehabilitation 
equivalent to $3.8 million in 2007 dollars.   Thus 
the historical cost to date is $272.5 million.  
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Figure 9: Longfellow Construction Costs
   Date   Cost      Cost
          (2007 $)
Initial Construction 1907   $2.6M      $249.0M
First Rehab  1959   $2.0M        $19.7M
Second Rehab  2002   $3.2M          $3.8M
Total Historical Cost (2007 $)       $272.5M
significantly in every subsequent year. De 
Sitter’s “Law of Fives” 14 estimates that if 
maintenance is not performed, then repairs 
equaling five times the maintenance costs 
are required; if the repairs are not made, the 
rehabilitation costs will be five times the 
repair costs.  Thus the compounding effects of 
deferring maintenance are dramatic, especially 
for an asset as old and neglected as the 
Longfellow Bridge.
As figure 11 shows, maintenance can restore 
the condition of an asset before its condition 
reaches the inflection point and begins to decline 
rapidly.  At the other extreme, the effect of 
not maintaining an asset is sometimes called 
“running to ground.” Once an asset exceeds its 
useful life, investment in maintenance is often 
fruitless unless major renovation is undertaken.  
The Longfellow Bridge suffers from a lack of 
annual maintenance compounded over many 
years.  Major repairs were undertaken in 1959 
and a facelift done in 2002, but years of neglect 
have caught up with the structure.  To determine 
what could have occurred had a planned and 
funded maintenance program been in effect, 
we will describe three scenarios that evaluate 
different levels of investment in maintenance.
Maintenance practices in the private sector 
have evolved considerably over the years. 
Most companies now implement some form 
of Reliability-Centered Maintenance (RCM), 
which predicts and prepares for future 
maintenance requirements. 15
Scheduled restoration is an essential component 
of RCM.  Rather than waiting for a facility to 
begin to fail, renovation/restoration projects 
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This historical cost of $272.5M is an estimate of 
the “sunk cost” into the bridge as it stands today. 
In other words, this is what has been spent on 
the bridge, in 2007 dollars, over its 100-year 
lifespan.
The concept of Life-Cycle Costs (LCC) is an 
important component of an investment decision 
for initial construction of any facility. 11B LCC 
encompasses all relevant costs over a designated 
study period, including the costs of designing, 
purchasing/leasing, constructing/installing, 
operating, maintaining, repairing, replacing and 
disposing of a particular building or system.
The effect of maintenance spending on the 
reduction of the cost of deferred maintenance 
with time is widely accepted. 13   In general, 
maintenance investments are more cost effective 
early in the life of the asset.  For any asset, it 
is expected that there is a 40 percent drop in 
quality over 75 percent of its lifetime, followed 
by a more precipitous drop in the final quarter of 
the asset’s life.  Since deferred maintenance is 
the compounded effect of deferring maintenance 
from one year to the next, the cost of deferred 
maintenance in year one will increase
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Figure 10: Condition vs Age Curve for General Assets showing the Effects of Maintenance           
Activities on the Condition of the Asset (Source: Based on Roberta Reese’s GASB Reporting                         
Model from July 13, 2006 ASCE/USACE Workshop on Condition Assessment)
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are scheduled during a slack or 
non-emergency period. 
Researchers are now considering the application 
of RCM principles to public-sector asset 
maintenance.  Risk analysis, reliability 
assessment, and computer modeling have 
enabled better predictions of the actual costs of 
various maintenance scenarios. For example, 
it has been estimated that if all public assets in 
Canada were renewed at the end of their service
life, then approximately $196.5 billion would 
be required each year to maintain and replace 
Canada’s estimated $5.5 trillion current built 
assets. 16
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The percentages in the first two scenarios were 
selected based on their relevance to existing best 
practices.  At higher maintenance investment 
levels, (e.g. five percent per year), the facility 
is maintained in pristine condition and savings 
from maintenance are negative.  This would be 
similar to taking your car to the shop when no 
repairs were needed.
In order to estimate the savings from past 
maintenance, the results of a Lifetime Extending 
Maintenance Model were used. 20 The model 
is based on the study of sixteen concrete deck 
bridges with applied road salt and freeze-thaw 
conditions.  The condition model used in the 
validation model was:
  batcy −=
Where:  y = condition
  c = start condition (100%)
  a = constant
  b = power constant
The Lifetime Extending Maintenance Model 
attempts to estimate the impact of maintenance 
spending on the decline of an asset’s condition.  
The estimated condition resulting from a 1% 
investment in maintenance was approximated 
at 60% of start condition c, thus the penalty 
for deferred maintenance is the cost of a 
renovation that would restore the bridge’s 40% 
decline from start condition c. The estimated 
condition resulting from a 2.5% investment in 
maintenance was approximated at 80% of c, thus 
any catch-up restoration efforts would only need 
to counteract the loss of 20% of start condition.
Recent advances in facility management have 
lead to the development of a standard set of 
definitions for asset lifecycle models. In order 
to prioritize maintenance activities, “condition 
indexing” describes the current condition of the 
asset and enables more accurate budgeting. 17
In particular, the facility condition index 
(FCI) has become a useful tool for capital 
asset planning. The FCI is equal to the amount 
of deferred maintenance plus any capital 
improvements required, divided by the current 
replacement value of the facility. If no capital 
improvements are required, such as building 
code upgrades or program changes, then the FCI 
is simply the amount of deferred maintenance 
divided by the replacement value.  An FCI of 0 
to 5% is considered good condition. 18  An FCI of 
6% to 15% is fair condition, and above 15% is 
poor condition.  
This calculation also provides a corresponding 
rule of thumb for the annual reinvestment 
rate (funding percentage) required to prevent 
expansion of the deferred maintenance backlog. 
19  In Minnesota, for instance, the Statewide 
Facility Management Group recommended 
a annual reinvestment rate of 2.82% of the 
replacement cost.  Current actual spending is at 
a rate of 1% due to budgetary constraints.
To apply the concept of annual reinvestment 
to the Longfellow Bridge, scenarios were 
developed for an annual reinvestment rate of 
1% per year, another at 2.5% per year, and as 
the actual scenario of 0% reinvestment over 100 
years, with two renovation projects. 
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Scenario 1
Annually invest 1 percent of the bridge’s 
capital cost in a maintenance program.  If 
an investment in maintenance of 1 percent 
occurred each year, that would have resulted in 
total lifetime maintenance spending of $62.7 
million in 2007 dollars.  With the addition of a 
projected $80 million in current rehabilitation 
costs (equal to 40% of the estimate), the total 
savings (relative to the actual scenario) would 
be approximately $80.8 million. 
Scenario 2
Annually invest 2.5 percent of the bridge’s 
capital cost in a maintenance program.  
Maintenance spending at a rate of investment 
of 2.5 percent each year would have resulted 
in total lifetime maintenance spending of 
$156.8 million. With the addition of projected 
rehabilitation costs, equal to 20% of the 
estimate, the total savings would be 
$26.7 million.
Scenario 3 
The actual scenario: no annual maintenance 
program but a major rehabilitation in 1959 
followed by another facelift in 2002.  Capital 
depreciation is assumed to be 100 percent of the 
rehabilitation cost, currently set at $200,000,000. 
The total cost to keep the bridge in good repair 
is $223.5 million in 2007 dollars. 
Clearly, regular maintenance will keep an asset 
in better condition than occasional maintenance 
or no maintenance at all.  Also, maintenance 
dollars spent early in the life of an asset have 
greater leverage than those spent towards the 
end of an asset’s life. Other lessons from the 
scenarios are described on page 17.
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Figure 11: Summary of Maintenance Scenarios (% asset value spent annually on maintenance)
                Scenario 1 (1%)       Scenario 2 (2.5%)             Scenario 3 (0)
Maintenance Cost       $62.7M             $156.8M                  $23.5M
Current Cost to Rehab                                       $80.0M               $40.0M                $200.0M
Total Cost to Return Bridge to Good Repair  $142.7M  $196.8M     $223.5M
Estimated Savings from Maintenance   $80.8M               $26.7M                        N/A
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Our Legacy of Neglect The Longfellow Bridge and the Cost of Deferred Maintenance Pioneer Institute for Public Policy Research
Figure 12. Degradation Curve (Source: Based on Roberta Reese’s GASB Reporting Model from July 13, 2006 ASCE/
USACE Workshop on Condition Assessment and Author’s Calculations)
-  Regular maintenance improves the service 
level of the asset.  While the Longfellow is 
not in danger of collapse, it is a minimally 
functional bridge, an eyesore with visible holes 
in its deck, periodically dropping debris into the 
river below. If we want our assets to contribute 
more to the Commonwealth’s quality of life, 
then regular maintenance is essential.  
-  Regular maintenance is more palatable 
from a budget perspective than major 
repairs. The Commonwealth has grappled for 
several years with the need to fund massive 
repairs on the Longfellow.  It would have been 
easier (and more cost effective) to find room 
in the budget for regular maintenance 
payments rather than a large lump sum to 
repair the structure.   
Lessons from the three scenarios
-  Early maintenance is more cost-effective 
than later maintenance. By spending regularly 
early in the life of the asset, high replacement 
costs in the future can be avoided.  
-  Maintenance is cost effective, and more 
so as the reconstruction price increases. 
The current scenarios are all based on the base 
case reconstruction cost of $200 million.  If 































The Longfellow Bridge is a dramatic example 
of the cost of deferred maintenance.  While 
we have focused on a highway bridge as an 
example, neglect threatens all types of public 
assets throughout the Commonwealth.  
4.1  The Extent of our 
        Maintenance Backlog
The many agencies and authorities of the 
Commonwealth own a huge spectrum of 
assets, from hospitals to parks to dormitories 
to beaches.  According to the Massachusetts 
Division of Capital Asset Management’s 21 
Report on Real Property, dated September 2006, 
the Commonwealth owns 78,838,841 square 
feet of buildings and 611,594 acres of land.  In 
the June 2006 Comprehensive Annual Finance 
Report, the Comptroller’s Office estimates the 
total depreciated value of state assets at $24.9 
billion. Almost all of these assets suffer from 
deferred maintenance or lack proper planning 
and funding to keep them properly maintained.   
The Office of Facilities Maintenance at DCAM 
maintains that the state’s overall backlog of 
deferred maintenance is $2.2 billion. 22
The problems caused by inadequate 
maintenance of public infrastructure plague all 
levels of government.  Since asset deterioration 
occurs gradually, there is a tendency to 
defer preventative maintenance.   Treating 
maintenance as a discretionary expense, 
combined with a diffusion of responsibility and 
outright inability to monitor asset condition, 
results in a massive and growing 
maintenance backlog. 
Figure 13 lists deferred backlog estimates for 
Massachusetts public entities, using publicly 
available studies and statements from each 
agency.  It should be noted that there are 
variations in methodology across each estimate, 
so the aggregate number should not be regarded 
as precise; rather it is a rough estimate of 
the Commonwealth’s deferred maintenance 
problem.
Note that this table is only a snapshot of our 
current maintenance backlog.  Other recent 
studies have found comparable problems 
throughout state government. For instance, 
the Judiciary has just completed a condition 
assessment on its 113 facilities.  Sixty-eight 
have deferred maintenance issues that need to be 
addressed. 23  This work is estimated to cost $500 
million. 
As for highway assets, MassHighway lists, 
under its structurally deficient (SD) bridge 
program, 501 structurally deficient bridges as 
of November 2006. 18b 232 of these bridges are 
being evaluated for repair, and of these 129 are 
undergoing repair construction.  An investment 
of $200 million per year is planned to reduce the 
number of structurally deficient bridges to 443 
by 2010. 
The Transportation Finance Commission report 
has also estimated a “funding gap” based on an 
analysis of needs and resources over an extended 
period of time. 24 The TFC’s “gap” is a projection 
of future needs; the table below lists estimates 
of what state entities need today, to clear the 
maintenance backlog they already have.
4. The Real Cost of Neglect: A Statewide Crisis
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Figure 13: Estimates of Maintenance Backlogs for State Entities.  
Entity     Source        Backlog Estimate ($B)
MassHighway - Pavement  MHD 5 Year Pavement Condition Tables  $6.2
MBTA     April 2007 PMT Advisory Board Meeting  $2.7
UMass (Amherst Campus)  UMass 2007 Financial Indicators Report  $1.6
DCR     11/12/06 Boston Globe Article   $1.3
State and Community Colleges 11/06 Roadmap     $1.2
Other UMass Campuses    UMass 2007 Financial Indicators Report        $1.1 
MassHighway - Bridges  10/06 Performance Report    $1.1
County Sheriffs   Authors’ Estimates                                  >$1.0*
Trial Court    Gienapp Design Associates 6/26/07 Report     $.5
Mass Pike - Bridges   5/15/07 Press Report       $.4
Other – MWRA, Massport, RTAs, Steamship Authority        Unknown
Total Maintenance Backlog        At least $17 billion
* County Sheriffs have a massive backlog of maintenance that is difficult to measure.  Most jail facilities operate in 
excess of stated capacity and many are not in compliance with all relevant Department of Public Safety and Department 
of Public Health regulations.  An effort to comply with all applicable regulations would be a multi-billion dollar effort. 
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4.2  Political and Bureaucratic
        Barriers to Reform
Just as the Longfellow Bridge symbolizes the 
cost of deferred maintenance, the question 
of who’s responsible for the bridge also 
highlights a statewide problem.  The bridge 
was initially constructed by the cities of 
Boston and Cambridge, and then operated 
by the Metropolitan Park System. In 1923, 
the Metropolitan Park System became the 
Metropolitan District Commission (MDC), 
which took on the original work of the Boston 
water and sewer boards.
While there are pockets of excellence on 
maintenance issues, notably the efforts of 
DCAM’s Office of Facilities Maintenance and 
MassHighway’s PONTIS system, there appears 
to be no high-level awareness of the magnitude 
of the problem of deferred maintenance, or any 
comprehensive statewide effort to address it in 
either the legislative or the executive branch of 
state government.  The table above includes data 
from at least nine separate reports and reporting 
systems, indicating the bureaucratic obstacles 
to any comprehensive statewide maintenance 
program.  
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In 2003, MDC was merged with the Department 
of Environmental Management to become the 
Department of Conservation and Recreation 
(DCR).  This new entity took on responsibilities 
for state forests and parks, while also overseeing 
a large portfolio of transportation-related assets, 
including 164 pedestrian and vehicular bridges.
Under an agreement with MassHighway, eight 
of DCR’s facilities are to be rehabilitated at 
an estimated cost of $397M.  They are the 
Longfellow Bridge, Storrow Drive Tunnel, 
Woods Memorial Bridge, Craigie Drawbridge, 
Craigie Dam, Craddock Bridge, Gilman Street 
Bridge and the Lech Walesa Bridge.  Ownership 
would remain with DCR, but responsibility for 
design and construction would be in the hands 
of MassHighway. 
As for other state assets, DCAM has some 
statutory oversight of maintenance activities 
for state agencies and building authorities.  
However, the relevant statutes, (Massachusetts 
General Law, Chapter 7, sections 39A - 43I) 
make a critical distinction between state 
agencies and public agencies.  Public agencies 
are defined to include authorities and other 
non-executive branch entities.  DCAM has only 
limited ability to compel record-keeping and 
reporting from public agencies.
The statutory responsibility for maintenance sits 
with each agency, which is typically charged 
with the ”care,” ”control,” or ”“supervision” of 
its facilities.  For instance, the commissioner 
of the Department of Public Health is charged 
with “general supervision and control” of its 
hospitals. 25  At the University of Massachusetts, 
the trustees are to:
 …manage and administer the university  
 and all property, real and personal,  
 belonging to the commonwealth and  
 occupied or used by the university,  
 and shall keep in repair houses,   
 buildings and equipment so used  
 or occupied. 26
This placement of responsibility creates a 
conflict, as agency managers and overseers 
face incentives to spend scarce budget dollars 
on operations, not maintenance.  Meanwhile, 
facility managers, who are most attuned to 
maintenance needs, report to agency managers 
who may not share their priorities.
For state agencies, DCAM’s primary statutory 
role is in enforcing standards (contained in 
MGL Chapter 7, Section 43C).  This section 
provides for yearly reporting of compliance with 
maintenance standards and empowers DCAM to 
perform regulatory inspections.  An escalating 
series of sanctions are provided for, including a 
take-over of an agency’s maintenance operations 
by DCAM until standards are met. 
As a practical and political matter, DCAM has 
not utilized these powers.  It lacks the funding, 
staff, and political power to effectively collect 
money from another agency and manage their 
maintenance operations for any length of time.
4.3  Attempts to Reduce the   
        Backlog
Given the diffusion of responsibility for assets, it 
is no surprise that the Commonwealth does not 
have one system to adequately inventory assets, 
assess their condition, or estimate the cost of 
deferred maintenance. 
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In the case of the Longfellow Bridge, the 
MDC (now DCR) had no formal inventory 
systems until two years ago.  Now they are 
utilizing FAMIS, the Facility Administration 
and Maintenance Information System, for 
their own assets, with the exception of major 
bridges including the Longfellow.  With MHD’s 
assumption of responsibility for the Longfellow, 
the bridge (and several other DCR bridges) 
will now become part of the PONTIS bridge 
maintenance system. 
PONTIS was developed by the Federal Highway 
Administration.  The software was made 
available to states in 1991 and incorporated into 
the American Association of State Highway and 
Transportation Officials (AASHTO) software 
product line in 1995.  PONTIS includes data and 
analytical models for an inventory of the state’s 
bridges including condition data, engineering 
and economic models to include deterioration 
prediction models, an array of improvement 
options and updating procedures, according to 
the USDOT Asset Management Primer. Thirty-
seven states, including Massachusetts, have 
procured a license to implement PONTIS.
PONTIS and FAMIS each serve as asset 
management systems for relatively limited 
classes of assets.  The asset management system 
with the broadest reach is CAMIS, operated by 
DCAM.  CAMIS is a comprehensive Capital 
Asset Management Information System that 
uses the same base software as FAMIS.  In a 
1999 Supplemental Budget, the Massachusetts 
Legislature appropriated $18 million for a 
statewide asset survey, which was conducted by 
Parsons Brinckerhoff in 2000-2001.  CAMIS 
survey data of over 5000 buildings, comprising 
more than 73 million square feet of space, is
used to inform and support capital planning and 
decision-making.
In addition to CAMIS, DCAM has built up 
its maintenance-related programming.  It has 
established an Office of Facilities Management 
(OFM) and it has begun a facility self-
assessment program for state buildings.  OFM 
has organized the Massachusetts Facilities 
Managers Association (MAFMA) to promote 
the wise use of assets and their maintenance and 
to promote the use of CAMIS as an operating 
tool.  However, as noted above, DCAM has 
limited statutory and practical powers to 
improve maintenance practices across all of 
state government. 
CAMIS was made available to all executive 
branch agencies, higher education schools, and 
the judicial branch.  Buildings owned by our 
public authorities, including MBTA, MTA, 
MWRA, MassPort, etc. have been excluded 
from the use of CAMIS as a management tool.  
Also excluded are all college and university 
buildings owned by the Massachusetts State 
College Building Authority or the University 
of Massachusetts Building Authority, which 
include certain dormitories, athletic centers, 
and dining halls. 27
CAMIS provides an array of asset management 
services, including the cataloging of deferred 
maintenance, the production of preventive 
maintenance orders, and the transmittal of 
service requests.  While all major facility-
owning agencies in the Executive Branch use 
CAMIS to some extent, its features have not 
been fully utilized across state government.
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5.1 Remove Disincentives for 
 Maintenance Budgeting
Maintenance spending is currently bifurcated 
between the operating budget (where many 
departments spend their own funds on 
maintenance) and the capital budget.  For 
many of the buildings and other non-highway 
structures in state government, DCAM spends 
its own capital funds for maintenance projects.
This bifurcation creates a disincentive for 
agency heads and program managers to spend 
on routine maintenance.  Any maintenance 
spending from an agency’s operating budget 
reduces funds available for programs.  The 
postponement of routine maintenance 
maximizes operating funds available in the 
current year, but also hastens the failure of 
capital assets. The eventual failure of the assets 
will result in an emergency disbursement of 
capital funds, which are under DCAM’s control 
and will not impact the agency’s operating 
budget.  Thus managers who spend money on 
maintenance are in effect penalized for trying to 
maintain their assets.
These disincentives for maintenance should 
be removed by rewarding agency leaders who 
keep their assets in good condition.  An accurate 
database and reporting system, such as CAMIS, 
should serve as the basis for any system of 
rewards.  Such a system would evaluate each 
agency’s ability to properly maintain assets, and 
direct incentive funding to those entities that 
have demonstrated a track record of 
responsible stewardship. 
5.2 Explore Innovative   
 Contracting
There is a robust public debate about the utility 
of different contractual forms to shift risk, 
cost, and control from the public sector onto 
the private sector.  The traditional process for 
construction is a three-step process of design-
bid-build, with a separate procurement process 
for each step.  Several innovative methods 
combine multiple steps in the process.  The text 
box below describes several of these methods.  
Each method provides a potential advantage 
for the state, including access to financing, 
faster execution of projects, outsourcing 
of maintenance responsibility or greater 
accountability for construction quality.  The 
inclusion of life-cycle costs and a plan for 
extended maintenance at the outset of a project, 
during the financing, design and construction 
stage, will insure that an adequate maintenance 
plan is in place and can be funded.  
Along with these positive attributes, potential 
shortcomings should also be considered, 
such as a perceived or actual loss of control 
of assets. This section does not address that 
broader debate.  It is intended to examine 
how innovative contracting has the potential 
to embed life-cycle costs into every project, 
ensuring that adequate maintenance is planned 
and funded. 
It should also be noted that current state law 
prevents the regular utilization of most of these 
techniques without special legislation.  Most 
of these contracting methods would require the 
suspension or amendment of several state laws, 
including sections of the public construction 
5. Strategies for Effective Asset Maintenance
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laws (Chapter 149 of the Massachusetts 
General Laws), procurement laws (Chap. 7 and 
Chap. 30B) and public works construction law 
(Chapter 30, Section 9M). 
Our Legacy of Neglect The Longfellow Bridge and the Cost of Deferred Maintenance Pioneer Institute for Public Policy Research
Several  innovative methods of construction contracting, financing and operation are currently being 
used throughout the United States and elsewhere. These include:
Build-Lease-Transfer - Similar to design-build, the facility is leased by the contractor to the 
government after construction.  The lease pays the contractor for construction costs of the facility. 
During the lease, the government operates the facility.  After the lease period, the government may or 
may not assume operation and maintenance to the facility.  This method would provide an incentive for 
higher quality construction (with expected result of lower maintenance costs) as the contractor would 
pay for maintenance previous to the transfer. 
Design-Build-Operate - a firm would design and build the facility and then operate it for a period of 
years.  The quality of construction would be expected to be high since the contractor would pay for the 
cost of maintenance of the structure.  The government owns the facility and may or may not assume 
maintenance at the end of the period.
Build-Operate-Own - This arrangement is similar to the previous example except that here the 
private sector contractor retains ownership of the facility.  This practice would place responsibility for 
maintenance on the owner, and funding for life-cycle costs would be embedded in the initial price of the 
project or on-going lease payments.  
Lease - For existing facilities, the government can provide the contractor with a leasehold interest in the 
asset.  The contractor makes improvements and operates and maintains the asset in agreement with terms 
of the lease.
Concession -The government grants the contractor exclusive rights to provide, operate, and maintain 
an asset over a long period of time.  The government maintains ownership of the asset, but maintenance 
standards are embedded in the contract and are the responsibility of the contractor.
Divestiture - The government transfers (sells) all or part of an asset to the private sector.  Conditions of 
sale provide for continued services, maintenance and operation.
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5.3   Dedicate Statewide Oversight  
         and Funding to Maintenance
In some states, the maintenance of facilities has 
become an integral and automatic part of state 
budgeting.  This section provides an overview of 
how Missouri, Utah, Washington, and Virginia 
have addressed their facilities maintenance 
problems. The State Infrastructure Bank 
program, created through federal legislation, 
has also shown promise.   Massachusetts has 
explored similar approaches, as explained 
below, with uneven success.
Missouri
Missouri established a separate fund for 
maintenance in 1998. 28  In the program’s first 
fiscal year, one tenth of one percent (0.1%) of 
the general fund was deposited in the Facilities 
Maintenance Reserve Fund (FMRF).  This 
percentage has increased by one tenth of one 
percent each year until the FMRF reaches 1% 
of the general fund in 2007.  Thereafter, it will 
continue to receive 1% of the general fund every 
fiscal year.  
By comparison, Massachusetts expects $17.85 
billion to flow into its General Fund in fiscal 
year 2008, therefore a fully funded contribution 
of 1% to a Facilities Maintenance Reserve Fund 
would be $178.5 million, and the initial payment 
(at 0.1%) to phase in a fund would be $17.85 
million.
Missouri withdraws money from the fund on an 
as-needed basis.  This requires each department 
to review the condition of facilities under their 
control and estimate the costs for repairs to 
maintain existing conditions or make 
needed upgrades.
Utah
The state of Utah has been working on the 
problem of deferred maintenance for almost 
15 years.  The first step was the creation of the 
Facilities Condition Analysis Program.  The 
state contracted with ISES Corp of Atlanta, 
GA to do an initial condition assessment of 
all state facilities.  Legislation was passed that 
established standards for evaluating condition 
and funding for capital improvements. 29
The statute defines “capital improvements” as 
any remodeling, alteration, replacement or repair 
project with a cost of less than $1.5 million; a 
site or utility improvement with a total cost of 
less than $1.5 million; or a new facility with a 
total construction cost of less than $250,000.  
“Capital developments” are defined as any 
remodeling, site or utility projects with a total 
cost of $1.5 million or more, new facility with 
a construction cost of $250,000 or more; or 
purchase of real property where an appropriation 
is requested to fund the purchase.  
The law prohibits the Legislature from 
funding design or construction of any new 
capital development projects until they have 
appropriated 1.1% of the replacement cost of 
existing state facilities to capital improvements.  
While such a binding restriction would most 
likely not pass the Massachusetts Legislature, 
it would serve as a useful tool to prioritize 
maintenance. 
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New construction accounts for about 8.5 percent 
of Utah’s $1.6B FY 2008 capital and debt 
service budget.  Under the law $10,138,600 is 
set aside for capital improvements. 
The capital improvement funds are administered 
by Division of Facilities and Construction 
Management. Agency projects are funded based 
on priorities from a Facility Condition Analysis 
database, maintained and upgraded each year 
by ISES Corp.  There are four categories of 
projects: Plant Adaptation, Capital Renewal, 
Deferred Maintenance, and O&M.  These 
projects are prioritized based on the urgency of 
the asset’s needs:
 1. Immediate 
 2. Within one year 
 3. Two-to-five years 
 4. Six-to-ten years.  
Kent Beers, Utah Director of Capital Planning, 
notes that for new capital development projects, 
funding is a “free for all,” but for capital 
improvement projects the state now has a 
“condition planning tool.” In discussions with 
legislators, he often equates this to the need to 
change the oil in your car.  Better to do that, he 
says, than have to buy a new engine.
As a state that uses the GASB 34’s modified 
approach to address infrastructure assets, Utah 
has shown leadership in addressing deferred 
maintenance. (See text box on page 30 for a 
summary of GASB 34.)
This affects not only their budget documents but 
also their financial reporting documents.  The 
State’s Comprehensive Annual Financial Report 
(CAFR) includes Required Supplementary 
Information on the infrastructure assets (roads 
and bridges) of the Utah Department of 
Transportation (UDOT).  A description of the 
pavement management system for roads and 
the structures inventory system for bridges is 
provided along with condition levels for the last 
three years.  Tables showing actual costs over 
the last five years and an estimate of the costs 
to maintain and preserve roads and bridges at or 
above the established condition levels are also 
included.
For instance, in FY2005 Utah spent $308 
million to maintain state roads and $54 
million to maintain bridges.  Presenting these 
figures in the CAFR is a critical component 
of the maintenance program, since it provides 
information on cost of maintenance to 
legislators, other elected officials, agency heads, 
non-profit organizations, business leaders and 
the general public.
Washington
The state of Washington has embarked on a 
rigorous look at state maintenance practices.  
The Washington State Department of 
Transportation conducted customer (driver) 
surveys in 2000 and again in 2005.  The results 
of the surveys have helped WSDOT focus on 
those infrastructure components most in need of 
repair. 29
Both the 2000 survey and 2005 survey indicated 
that roadway surfaces had the most pressing 
need to be improved.  Most of the respondents 
rated highway maintenance as average to above 
average.  The surveys are part of a Maintenance 
Accountability Process (MAP) where in-house 
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condition surveys assess the maintenance 
levels that exist at any given point in time. 
These surveys assess a broad range of metrics 
- pavement condition, function of drainage 
structures, condition of bridges, vegetation 
levels, etc.  These assessments are collected 
quarterly in a report, known as “The Gray 
Notebook,” which presents the metrics in a 
simple format, and also includes additional 
detail for expert study.
In addition, recently enacted legislation 
requires the Washington State Department of 
Transportation to utilize a life-cycle cost model 
for all of its capital assets.  All assets must be 
inspected and updated for asset condition at least 
every three years. 31
Virginia
The Commonwealth of Virginia has studied the 
issue of deferred maintenance for several years. 32 
In response to legislation passed by the 
GASB 34: An Accounting Standard that Improves Asset Management? 
New governmental accounting standards provide another potential avenue for addressing asset 
management.  In June 1999, the Government Accounting and Standards Board published Statement 34 
(GASB 34), which set reporting standards for public entities and required them to depreciate their assets 
using one of two methods – a “straight-line method” or a “modified method” 
The straight-line method is based on historical costs and straight-line depreciation of assets.  The 
Commonwealth has selected this method for its financial reporting and is recommending that local 
governments use it as well.  (MASS 2001, p.6-9) 
The modified method is a more labor-intensive system of reporting that requires entities to have an asset 
management system and regular reporting on the effect of maintenance efforts.  The asset management 
system must be comprehensive, up-to-date, and provide guidance on required maintenance expenditures. 
Although this system is clearly more complex and difficult to administer, it provides a more accurate 
picture of the true state of an entity’s assets.   
Using the Commonwealth’s straight-line method, no condition evaluations are required and, after its 
40-year life (as determined for the purposes of accounting standards), an asset, such as the Tobin Bridge, 
falls off the financial report.  Thus the current CAFR contains no information on any asset older than 40 
years.  
Using Capital Asset Inventory Control (the “modified method”) in the future could result in better 
financial reporting and a better accounting for maintenance and preservation of capital assets.  
2 7        2 8
General Assembly (Chap 4, Section C. 194.1 
of the Special Session) the Virginia Auditor 
of Public Accounts (APA) issued an interim 
report in December 2004. That report contained 
a summary of state-owned buildings and 
compared Virginia’s Building Life Cycle with 
an Ideal Building Life Cycle.  A final report 
was issued in December of 2005 indicating 
that 5,269 of Virginia’s 10,449 buildings had a 
deferred maintenance backlog of $1.626 billion. 
State Infrastructure Banks 
With the passage of ISTEA, the 1995 
transportation funding authorization, the 
Federal Highway Administration encouraged 
formation of State Infrastructure Banks to 
fund transportation projects.  Originally 
limited to 10 pilot states, the program has 
proven highly successful.  The states involved 
in the pilot program capitalized their banks 
with a combination of federal funds, state 
appropriations and bond proceeds.
In concept, a SIB is similar to a revolving 
fund.  Capitalized funds are placed in the bank 
and then loaned out to qualified borrowers.  
Payments made back to the bank in the form 
of capital and interest are then loaned out to 
new borrowers.  In the latest 2005 federal 
transportation reauthorization act, called 
SAFETEA-LU, all states are eligible to establish 
an SIB and Massachusetts has legislation 
pending.
The SIB can also issue letters of security or loan 
guarantees to borrowers who wish to finance 
through private sources such as a bank or private 
trust.  Borrowers can be public entities such as 
cities, towns or regional agencies, or private 
entities like railroads or private toll road
builders. By providing such funds, significant 
leveraging of private investments can occur. The 
pending legislation in Massachusetts proposes 
a Board of Trustees including the Secretary of 
Administration and Finance, the Secretary of 
Transportation, the State Treasurer and a fourth 
member appointed by the Governor, possibly 
with the consent of the Senate.
Proposed projects must be approved by 
an advisory board, which may consist of 
the appointees of the Co-Chairmen of the 
Legislature’s Joint Committee on Transportation, 
and the Directors of the Metropolitan Planning 
Organizations.
States that have created an SIB have moved 
ahead of Massachusetts in providing for 
transportation infrastructure.  In Arizona, the 
SIB was first capitalized in 1996 with $6.7 
million in federal funds.  By 1998, the SIB was 
capitalized with $25.1 million in federal funds 
and $2.4 million in matching state monies. 33  
With interest earnings of $2.2 million, the SIB 
account as of October 1998 was $39.7 million.   
By 2006 the state had approved 53 loans for 
transportation/economic development projects at 
a value of $582 million. 34
In Texas, the state legislature authorized the SIB 
in 1997.  As of August 2000, the Texas SIB had 
disbursed $39 million and made commitments of 
nearly $26 million more. As of August 2000, the 
SIB had a cash balance of roughly $197 million, 
of which $171.5 million was not yet committed 
to projects.  Today the Texas SIB has approved 
67 loans, totaling $294.9 million which have 
leveraged more than $2.03 million. 35 
With a focus on economic development and 
transportation needs, the proposed
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Massachusetts State Infrastructure Bank could 
provide significant leveraging power in helping 
cities and towns to solve the maintenance and 
replacement needs of aging transportation 
facilities.
Massachusetts
This study chronicles many of the problems 
faced by Massachusetts in the area of asset 
maintenance.  There has been some attempt 
to address these problems. In the mid-‘90s, 
the Massachusetts House Ways & Means 
Committee began to explore options for 
increasing budgeting for maintenance.  The 
initiative that resulted in the CAMIS database 
grew out of this period.  A Capital Maintenance 
Reserve was created and funded with $12 
million for a single fiscal year, but was 
eliminated in the following fiscal year.  
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The Longfellow Bridge is in sad shape, in part 
because of age and weather conditions, but 
mostly due to our neglect of maintenance.  It 
serves as a crucial artery for the city, carrying 
almost 50,000 vehicles per day plus 100,000 
Red Line riders.  Yet, it has only received two 
significant rehabilitation efforts in a hundred 
years, totaling $23.5 million in 2007 dollars.  
The results of this neglect are troubling: massive 
deterioration of key structural components of the 
bridge, significant cracking in the stone piers, 
and potential settling of the foundation.  Fixing 
these problems is currently estimated to cost 
$180 million to $200 million, with the potential 
for huge cost escalation if additional problems 
are found. 
Applying industry standard life-cycle cost 
scenarios to the bridge demonstrates that a 
regular program of maintenance would have 
extended its useful service life and lowered the 
Commonwealth’s overall costs.  
The decay of the Longfellow is symptomatic 
of a problem that threatens most of the 
Commonwealth’s assets.  These assets suffer 
from a maintenance backlog in the tens of 
billions of dollars.  We lack a centralized system 
to comprehensively manage our assets.   Our 
financial reporting system lacks procedures 
for condition assessment of these assets. The 
responsibility for their maintenance is highly 
compartmentalized and responsibility for 
maintenance can be unclear.  Most importantly, 
we either fail to budget for maintenance, or 
discourage upkeep by forcing state managers 
to fund maintenance out of annual operating 
budgets.
Furthermore, there is no statewide plan in place 
to stop the problem from growing worse.  Every 
new structure that is built, every road that is 
paved, every new asset of the Commonwealth 
is currently doomed to decay for lack of 
maintenance.  
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7.1  A Recommendation for   
        Immediate Reform
Until the Commonwealth has a system in place 
to measure, fund, and address the maintenance 
needs of its assets, it should only begin a 
building project when it has a comprehensive 
life-cycle maintenance and capital replacement 
plan in hand.  This plan must detail the annual 
operating and maintenance investments 
that are required to keep the facility in good 
condition.  Our failure to maintain our assets 
has actually driven up infrastructure costs, as 
the risk of catastrophic failure forces us to fund 
emergency repairs. Building new assets without 
a comprehensive maintenance plan merely 
exacerbates the problem. 
7.1  Recommendations for   
        Systemic Reform:            
        Measure, Budget, Execute
Measure
The Executive Office of Administration 
and Finance should, in cooperation with 
the Executive Office of Transportation and 
Public Works, and the Division of Capital 
Asset Management, prepare a report on asset 
conditions, condition trends, maintenance efforts 
and maintenance plans for each department and 
authority by asset class.  The report should be 
presented to the Governor and general public.  
This report should be updated on a yearly basis, 
and present in a digestible format: the status of 
assets by department, including maintenance 
efforts performed over the previous year, funds 
expended, and the progress (or lack thereof) 
in maintenance levels from previous years. A 
model program would be the Washington State 
Department of Transportation’s Gray Notebook 
accountability program. 
(see http://www.wsdot.wa.gov/accountability/).
As part of this report, the amounts expended 
by each department on maintenance should 
be included and tracked on a yearly basis (and 
matched to specific assets where possible).  
Changes to the state accounting system 
already allow some automatic tabulation of 
maintenance-related spending.  To the extent 
feasible, further changes to the system should 
be made to allow for transparent budgeting, 
expenditure, and tracking of maintenance 
spending. 
Another option to be considered is the 
implementation of the modified method of 
GASB 34 reporting, which would require 
comprehensive usage of asset management 
systems.  This would insure that condition 
assessments would be conducted and the value 
of public assets would be measured.
Budget 
The Executive Office for Administration and 
Finance should work to reverse the existing 
disincentives that discourage the use of 
operating funds for maintenance and actively 
reward those agencies that are working 
diligently on maintenance.  Each state agency 
having use of and responsibility for maintenance 
of any capital asset should include in its annual 
operating budget an amount equal to 2 percent 
of the replacement value for its capital assets. 
(Note that this is not 2% of total program 
budgets.) On or before the beginning of each 
fiscal year, each agency should submit to 
the division a plan for addressing deferred 
maintenance for each such capital asset.  
7.  Recommendations
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A Commonwealth Facilities Maintenance 
Reserve Fund should be established, beginning 
with only 0.1 percent of the general fund in the 
first year and rising 0.1 percent per year to 1 
percent of the general fund in the 10th year.  
The Legislature and Governor should continue 
to utilize budgetary surpluses to perform  pay-
as-you-go capital maintenance projects.  This is 
sound budgeting practice as it utilizes one-time 
sources of funds to address existing maintenance 
needs, rather than creating a liability in future 
years that must be included in future budgets.   
Execute
Maintenance accountability issues in 
Massachusetts stem from several systemic 
problems, including a lack of centralized, 
accessible data and the diffusion of 
responsibility for asset maintenance.  The lack 
of data is a larger problem where ownership 
is distributed among multiple agencies and 
authorities.  With diffusion of ownership comes 
diffusion of maintenance responsibility, some of 
which lies with DCAM and some of which lies 
with the individual agencies and authorities.
The Governor should establish general 
principles for infrastructure maintenance to be 
followed by all state infrastructure agencies, 
and should charge the Executive Office of 
Transportation and Public Works and the 
Division of Capital Asset Management with 
responsibility for establishing a process to more 
fully develop and oversee guidelines that require 
each state agency to plan for maintenance, and 
make regular public reports on the magnitude of 
unfunded maintenance needs.
The Governor’s Office should empower DCAM 
to fulfill its statutory ability to monitor the 
state’s asset maintenance.  DCAM’s operating 
funds were effectively pulled during the 
budget process several years ago, a clear signal 
of the agency’s relative political weakness.  
For DCAM to properly manage state assets 
would require not only increased funding for 
operations, but also a public expenditure of 
political capital to empower the agency.
The existing CAMIS database represents an 
underutilized resource.  Funds for maintenance 
should only be made available for projects 
included in the CAMIS database.  The Governor 
should issue an Executive Order compelling all 
state agencies and authorities (with the exception 
of those using another asset management 
system, such as PONTIS and FAMIS) to take 
advantage of CAMIS.  
Lastly, the Governor’s Office and the Executive 
Office for Administration and Finance should 
make a sustained effort to make maintenance a 
priority for program managers, and rewarding 
them and their programs for sustained 
improvements in maintenance practices and 
asset condition.   
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